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Introduction 
It is a cornerstone of industrial relations (IR) theory that the potential for 
conflict is inherent to the employment relationship. Across countries, forms of 
workplace conflict and methods of conflict resolution take a range of different forms. 
Yet aside from attempts to understand cross-national variation in strikes, there is little 
research examining systemic differences in the manifestation and management of 
workplace conflict (a notable exception is Roche et al. 2014). The following analysis 
seeks to fill this void by analyzing through a comparative lens practices for 
addressing employment related conflict in four countries: Germany, Italy, the US and 
Australia. 
It is well established that within developed economies we find different 
industrial relations systems, clustering along dimensions such as the degree of 
centralization/decentralization of collective bargaining (Katz 1993; Traxler 1995, 
2003), systems with strong or weak state-involvement (Hassel 2013, Ferner 1994), 
the division of interest representation in single and dual channel systems (Rogers & 
Streeck 1995), the nature of union identity (Hyman 2001), multi vs. single union 
confederation systems (Gumbrell-McCormick & Hyman 2013) or systems with or 
without board-level representation of workers (Waddington & Conchon 2015) to 
name just a few. While in general, national systems of interest representation1 and 
collective bargaining have been analyzed quite comprehensively, we know much less 
about cross-national variation in the mechanisms for addressing work and 
employment related disputes.  
                                                          
1 According to Dunlop (1958: 7) an industrial relations system “at any one time in its development is regarded 
as comprised of certain actors, certain contexts, and ideology which binds the industrial-relations system 
together, and a body of rules created to govern the actors at the work place and work community.” 
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In this paper we will seek to advance understanding of comparative workplace 
dispute resolution by looking at two general issues. First, we investigate specific 
dispute resolution practices and institutions in our four countries and seek to develop 
a system of classification that captures the variation between them. Second, we 
investigate the linkages between practices and institutions within each of these four 
countries and analyze the nature of complementarity in their systems of workplace 
dispute resolution.  
Our classification of different practices and institutions for dispute resolution is 
informed by decades of scholarship on comparative industrial relations (Kerr et a 
1960, Hyman & Ferner 1994, Martin & Ross 1999, Bamber et al. 2011, Frege & Kelly 
2013). While this research is diverse in its own right, the degree of state involvement 
and the level of centralization are two key dimensions that have frequently been used 
in this literature for classifying national systems of employment relations. We build on 
this literature in our analysis of systems for workplace dispute resolution by looking at 
two related dimensions.    
Within our first dimension we look at the importance of state-level actors for 
resolving conflict. National patterns might – on one extreme – be subject to intense 
regulation by public authorities, be it the state and its agencies or the court system. 
At the opposite end of the continuum, in contrast, patterns might be dominated by 
private or voluntary procedures, whereby individuals or collective actors address 
conflict free of interference from public authorities. We refer to this as the regulated-
voluntarist dimension 
In a second dimension we ask whether conflict is to be addressed at the 
individual or collective level. We assume that conflict might be addressed individually 
by single employees and employers themselves or through collective actors such as 
4 
 
unions, works councils, employers’ associations or alternative dispute resolution 
bodies. We refer to this as the collective-individual dimension.  
We begin by setting out the framework for our comparative analysis. Then we 
turn to describe our four national system examples: Germany, the United States, 
Italy, and Australia We follow with our comparative analysis and discussion of the 
implications of our findings.   
 
Framework for the Analysis 
In conducting a comparative analysis, it is necessary to define what it is that 
will be compared. Our general focus is on comparing systems for resolving workplace 
conflict. Given the substantial variation that exists between different national systems, 
an initial analytical problem is to identify common features of these systems that we 
can examine in each of our cases. Previous accounts on workplace dispute 
resolution systems have focused on different aspects or pillars of such systems.  
The first pillar is the set of parties to the conflict. Traditionally in the labor 
relations field, the focus has been on labor and management as the key parties to 
conflict. However there is increasing diversity across countries in how these parties 
are constituted. Is labor organized collectively or acting as individual employees? Is 
management decentralized at the establishment level, acting at the firm level, or 
organized collectively through employers’ associations?  
The second pillar is the nature of the conflict between the parties. Are disputes 
mainly about wages and other terms and conditions of employment? Are operational 
and strategic decisions of the organization part of the terrain of labor-management 
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conflict or restricted to unilateral managerial authority? To what extent are disputes 
over employee rights a central manifestation of labor-management conflict? 
The third pillar is the process of conflict resolution. What types of dispute 
resolution procedures are used to resolve conflicts between labor and management? 
Procedures may involve public mechanisms like labor courts and employment 
tribunals. Alternative dispute resolution procedures such as arbitration and mediation 
are used in many systems. In some countries, private adjustment of disputes through 
negotiated or organizationally established procedures are important. 
The fourth pillar is the source and role of power in the system. Bargaining 
power is a central construct in labor relations theory. In analyzing dispute resolution 
systems it is important to identify and account for the sources of power for the parties 
in the system (Colvin 2016). How is labor able to bring pressure on management to 
achieve its goals in resolving conflicts? How is management able to resist pressure 
from labor? What is the source of authority and power for neutrals seeking to resolve 
disputes?  
  We build on these key pillars, the parties to conflict, subjects of conflict, conflict 
resolution processes, and power relations, to describe our four different national 
systems of conflict resolution. We then extend this analysis by comparing these 
systems cross-nationally along two axes: the regulated-voluntarist dimension; and 
the collective-individual dimension.  
The regulated-voluntarist dimension captures variation in the role of state 
versus private actors in the system, thus giving center stage to the parties of conflict 
as well as the power relations between parties involved. On the regulated end of this 
axis, we find systems that feature a more direct role for state actors as key actors in 
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the resolution of work disputes, such as the use of public tribunals to resolve 
disputes. Public agencies in regulated systems are often important actors in dealing 
with specific work disputes, rather than just establishing the ground rules for the 
system. Built on the sovereignty of the state provides such agencies with substantial 
power resources as well as effective means to enforce their decisions. By contrast, in 
systems on the voluntarist end of the spectrum, private parties are the main actors in 
the system, developing their own dispute resolution processes with only limited or 
indirect involvement from state actors.  
 The collective-individual dimension captures the degree to which work 
disputes are individualized, thus involving the pillars of parties to and subjects of 
conflict. Work disputes typically involves only one employee or a small group, as key 
parties or are collectivized, involving employees acting as a group through unions, 
works councils or other collective structures. In addition to reflecting how labor is 
organized or not as actors in the system, this dimension also reflects the nature of 
the conflicts being resolved. In more collective systems, work disputes more typically 
concern conflicts over subjects such as the implementation of collective agreements 
negotiated by unions or other collective groups of employees. By contrast, in more 
individualized systems, conflicts increasingly involve disputes over general 
employment rights that are often established by legislation and belong to the 
individual employee rather than to a collective group of employees.  
 Put together, these two dimensions provide us with the comparative 
framework within which we will analyze our four cases. The framework is presented 
graphically in Figure One.  
[figure 1 about here] 
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From what we know about our four industrial relations systems we predict the Italian 
and US cases to be more voluntaristic as state influence in labor relations is 
considered to be comparatively weak (see for example Locke 1995; Katz et al. 2007). 
In contrast, labor relations in Germany and Australia are considered to be more 
regulated, with the strong influence of the famous Award-system in Australia and 
statutes as well as court decisions in Germany (see for example Wright and 
Landsbury 2016; Keller and Kirsch 2016). Despite these similarities which lead us to 
place the regulated pair of Germany and Australia into the upper cells of Figure 1, 
whereas the voluntaristic pair of Italy and the US are in the lower two cells, our two 
country-pairs also have to be classified along the collective-individual dimension. 
With the dominant role played by unions and employers associations in Italy and 
Germany, these two countries share common ground in being more collectivist and 
can be located in the left (collective) side of Figure 1. In contrast, in Australian and 
the US, labor and employment relations are more individualized and so we would 
expect workplace conflict and conflict resolution to be more focused on the individual 
level, placing this pair of countries in the right-hand cells of Figure 1. Whether this 
classification based on their general systems of labor and employment relations also 
holds for systems of conflict resolution will be investigated in our comparative 
analysis of the four national systems. 
 Beyond the analysis of different national-level practices or institutions we also 
know very little on how they are interconnected at the national or sub-national level. 
Do they take the shape of distinct, coherent national systems or, alternatively, do 
different sub-national procedures or systems operate independently to address 
particular types of conflict? How do sub-national procedures or systems interact with 
8 
 
each other and do they do so in a way that enhances or reinforces the combined 
national system?   
While recent scholarship has forcefully made the case for national industrial 
relations institutions or “varieties” (Hall & Soskice 2001, Hancké 2009) this view has 
been challenged by observations of prevailing if not increasing within country 
variation (Locke 1992; Katz & Darbishire 2000; Thelen 2014). When analyzing 
dispute resolution practices in our four country cases we also seek to investigate to 
what degree national practices are linked to each other forming national patterns 
which are based on institutional complementarities. Such complementarities can take 
the shape of two different forms. Supplementarity, as a first form, emerges when one 
institution makes up for the deficiencies of the other (Crouch 2005). Synergy as the 
second form touches on the “mutually reinforcing effects of compatible incentive 
structures in different subsystems of the economy” (Deeg 2005: 3). We will 
investigate the extent of supplementarity and synergy in conflict resolution practices 
in each of our four countries. 
 We next present our four national case studies, Germany, the United States, 
Italy, and Australia.  
Germany 
Much of German labor relations have been characterized by “juridification”, a 
term which refers to a dense web of statutory rules and procedures that restricts the 
behavior of key collective actors in an effort to reduce levels of conflict at work 
(Müller-Jentsch 1997: 303; Keller 2008: 66-7). While “juridification” is certainly 
emphasizing the regulated dimension of conflict resolution, within the second 
dimension of our analysis – individual vs. collective – outcomes turn out to be more 
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diverse. As will be shown in this section, different elements of the German conflict 
resolution system give room for individual action while other parts are heavily 
dominated by collective actors. 
At the heart of the German system of conflict resolution is the so-called “dual 
system” of interest representation, which ensures that workers’ interests are 
represented through collective bargaining, conducted between trade unions and 
employers’ associations (or single employers), above the company level on the one 
hand, and at the plant-level through establishment-level works councils on the other 
hand. While employees are free to address their legal claims arising from their 
employment contract in a well-developed system of public labor courts, a major focus 
of the German system of dispute resolution is at the collective-level involving unions, 
works councils, employers and employers’ associations as key actors (Behrens 
2014).  
 
Collective bargaining  
Collective bargaining is the responsibility of unions and employers’ 
associations. Agreements are mostly negotiated for an entire industry within a certain 
region (in most cases this is one of the 16 German states (Länder)), but a number of 
national-level agreements can be identified, for example, in banking and in the public 
sector. The German Collective Bargaining Act (Tarifvertragsgesetz), however, also 
allows for company-level agreements to be negotiated between a union and a 
company’s management. While the framework for collective bargaining is provided 
for by statute and by the German constitution, the latter guaranteeing the famous 
concept of “collective bargaining autonomy” free of government interference, 
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collective bargaining dispute resolution boards are – if created at all – to be 
voluntarily created by unions and employer associations (Weiss 2012: 805-6).  
Most multi-employer agreements are negotiated between one of the 
approximately 700 employers’ associations (most of them directly or indirectly 
affiliated with the Confederation of German Employers, BDA) and one of the eight 
affiliates of the German Trade Union Confederation, DGB. In 2015, 31 per cent of 
establishments in west Germany and 21 per cent in east Germany were covered by a 
collective agreement (both types: industry and plant-level) (Ellguth and Kohaut, 2016: 
284). Because collective bargaining coverage rises along with company size, this 
leads to 59 per cent of all employees in west Germany and 49 per cent in east 
Germany being covered by a collective agreement (Ellguth and Kohaut, 2016: 284). 
Conflict in the area of collective bargaining takes the shape of strikes and 
lockouts, both being guaranteed by section 9 III of the German constitution. While 
there is no designated law regulating strikes in Germany, several standards and 
restrictions have been established by major decisions of the Federal Constitutional 
Court (Bundesverfassungsgericht) and the Federal Labour Court 
(Bundesarbeitsgericht). Among other standards, the courts have established that 
strikes are to be called by a union, are only legal to pursue a goal which could be 
regulated by a collective agreement (implying that political strikes are considered to 
be illegal) and when a collective agreement has expired or when no agreement is 
existing (on a particular subject) at all. In addition, strikes should be a weapon of last 
resort (ultima ratio principle) and should not be excessively used 
(Verhältnismäßigkeit). 
When compared to other OECD countries, strike activity in Germany is rather 
moderate. In terms of working days lost per 1,000 employees (averages for the years 
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2004-2007) Germany’s strike activity is at the lower end of the distribution with only 
Austria, Sweden, Switzerland, the Netherlands and Poland having less strike activity 
(Dribbusch, 2010: 159). In recent years, lockouts by employers have been hardly 
used at all (Schroeder/Silvia 2014: 357). 
 
Establishment level interest representation 
Works councils, according to the Works Constitution Act (WCA), can be 
formed in establishments with more than five employees are elected by the entire 
workforce (rather than just by union members). They represent workers’ day-to-day 
interests in areas such as hiring, transfers, dismissals, company restructuring, and 
discipline, but also work organization, working time regulation, overtime work, and the 
administration of company facilities such as cafeterias, childcare or housing. Yet the 
WCA also imposes limits on the scope of works council activities. In particular, works 
councils are not allowed to either bargain collectively (section 77 III WCA) or to call a 
strike (section 74 II WCA). In 2015, 42 percent of all west German employees in 
establishments with more than 5 employees were represented by a works council. In 
east Germany, only 33 percent of all employees were covered (Ellguth and Kohaut, 
2016: 288). 
While employees are entitled to address individual grievances directly to the 
employer, or to the works council, the most common dispute resolution procedure at 
the establishment-level are arbitration panels. Such panels are mostly used to 
resolve collective-level conflict between works councils and management. In cases of 
workplace conflict concerning “differences of opinion” an arbitration panel is required 
by the WCA to produce a legally binding decision (section 76 I WCA). In conflicts that 
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involve matters where works councils enjoy statutory co-determination rights (not just 
information or consultation rights), the arbitration procedures can be activated by one 
side, either the WC or the employer. Panels are composed of an equal number of 
works council and employer representatives, as well as a neutral chair. In practice, 
the chair is usually a professional judge from the local labor court. The decision taken 
by the arbitration panel has the character of a works agreement, which is an 
enforceable contract-like document. A recent study has found that about 11% of 
establishments (only private sector establishments with more than 20 employees 
possessing a works council) have used arbitration in the previous two years (Behrens 
2007: 180). As in the case of collective bargaining, establishment-level interest 
representation is heavily emphasizing the collective over the individual level. The 
WCA is exercising strong regulatory powers over establishment level labor relations 
as well as conflict. While in the case of collective bargaining, the law is providing for a 
general framework based on which collective actors negotiate, the effect of the WCA 
at the establishment-level is much more immediate.  
Statutory Employment Rights 
A third level through which workers’ grievances can be expressed is individual 
employment rights. While many aspects of the employment relationship are regulated 
by collective bargaining (between unions and employers) or through works 
agreements at the establishment level (negotiated between plant management and 
works council) German law provides for a variety of minimum standards in areas 
such as maximum length of the working day, minimum vacation days, safety and 
health standards, maternity leave and – enacted quite recently in 2015 – minimum 
wages. Statutory minimum standards are important because first, they provide for a 
minimum floor and second, more than a third of all German workplaces with more 
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than five employees are not covered by either collective bargaining or works councils. 
Employees can litigate their claims in a special labor court system, a branch of the 
public court system which is fairly easy to access, with a local court available in many 
localities with moderate court fees (Weiss 2012). It should be noted, however, that 
labor courts are also in charge of litigating individual and collective claims based on 
standards set by collective bargaining or by works councils. 
When compared to the two other areas of dispute resolution, collective 
bargaining and establishment-level worker representation through works councils, the 
litigation of worker’s claims is certainly the most individualized area. While – as the 
term “juridification” of German labor relations suggests – all three areas are regulated 
by statute or constitutional rights, the effect of regulation in collective bargaining 
(“framework regulation”) is less immediate when compared to the two remaining 
areas. This is not to suggest, however, that the three areas of conflict resolution are 
independent from each other, an aspect where the next section is turning to. 
 
Conflict, Complementarities and Change in German Labor Relations 
As we have argued in the introduction, complementarities first include that 
both set of institutions are not just the same. As the brief description of Germany’s 
dual system of industrial relations suggests, both elements of the system are based 
on different general principles. First, the two arenas are dominated by different 
actors: works councils and plant management at the establishment-level, and labor 
unions and employers’ association (in some case individual employers) in the case of 
collective bargaining above the establishment level. Also, different laws apply to 
regulate the two pillars: the WCA in case of the establishment-level and the 
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Collective Bargaining Act and Section 9 of the German constitution in the case of 
labor relations above the establishment. As for the different key tasks to be pursued 
by the actors at both levels are concerned, the differences are also quite striking: The 
WCA prohibits works councils from negotiating collective agreements, while section 2 
of the Collective Bargaining Act assigns the sole responsibility for concluding 
agreements on wages, hours and working conditions to unions, employers and 
employers’ associations.  
As we have also argued, complementarities might come in different forms, 
either as institutions supplementing each other (compensating for each others 
shortcomings) or by providing for synergies (providing for mutually reinforcing 
effects). As the case of the dual system clearly shows, there is much room for 
synergies. The – de jure – rigid separation of responsibilities has important 
consequences for potential employment-related conflict. As responsibility for matters 
such as wages, hours and working condition is mostly removed from the 
establishment level and assigned to collective bargaining parties, conflict arising from 
“distributive bargaining”, to use the term introduced in Walton and McKersie’s (1965) 
seminal work, has been largely removed from the plant level.  
Being, at least to some degree, relieved of the task of having to negotiate over 
wages, plant-level management and works councils are freed to address other issues 
and problems. To use another of Walton and McKersie’s (1965) concepts, 
“integrative bargaining” matters dominate their deliberations, with the focus very 
much on problem solving rather than on distributing a ‘cake’ of a fixed size. Working 
together to solve problems strengthens a collaborative ethos between plant level-
management and works councils. As a result of these synergies there is not an end 
to conflict, it is just regulated or “bounded”. There is still plenty of space for diverging 
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interests at the establishment level. To mention just one example: while the length of 
the working week is to be regulated by collective bargaining, the distribution of these 
hours over the working week, rules determining the beginning and end of the working 
day, overtime work, the introduction of working time accounts (whereby hours could 
be banked to take time off at a later point in time) as well as procedures for the 
measurement and documentation of working time are all the responsibility of the 
works council.  
Such complementarities, however, do not imply different levels of conflict 
compensating for each other. As previous research has shown, different conflict 
relationships such as conflict between works council (WC) and management (“class-
conflict”), between WC and the workforce (“representational conflict”) or even union-
WC conflict (“conflict of solidarity”) are positively correlated with each other. So, for 
example, a high level of conflict in a works council’s relationship with management is 
not associated with comparatively low levels of conflict of solidarity between the WC 
and unions, rather high levels of WC-management conflict is associated with high 
levels of WC-union conflict (Behrens 2017).  
Complementarities are also affected by major developments within the larger 
system of German labor relations institutions. First, coverage by both works councils 
and multi-employer bargaining has been on a decline for more than 20 years (Keller 
and Kirsch 2016) as has union density (Dribbusch/Birke 2016). This ongoing decline 
reduces the areas within the German political economy for which complementary 
institutions are effective and, in turn, increases the size of those unregulated areas 
which are subject to voluntarist and more individualized modes of dispute resolution. 
In addition, a strong and enduring tendency for the decentralization of collective 
bargaining (mostly through opening clauses which empower firm level actors to 
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derive form standards agreed upon at industry level) is reducing the system’s power 
to keep distributional bargaining (and conflict coming along with it) away from the 
establishment-level (Traxler 2003; Bispinck/Schulten (2003). By way of bringing 
works councils back into collective bargaining, complementarities within the wider 
system of regulating work related conflict have been weakened.  
 
United States 
Workplace dispute resolution in the U.S. operates through three distinct 
subsystems. Union represented workplaces feature elaborate contractual grievance 
procedures that culminate in binding arbitration by private neutral labor arbitrators. 
Statutory and common law employment rights are enforced through a complex and 
highly conflictual court litigation system. Meanwhile, nonunion workplaces feature a 
range of procedures and systems for conflict management adopted and managed 
unilaterally by employers. These three distinct subsystems produce a fractured 
landscape for workplace dispute resolution in the U.S. that is characterized by its 
individualistic focus and privatized structure.  
 
Unionized Workplace Conflict and Grievance Procedures 
 Dispute resolution in unionized workplaces in the U.S. is shaped by the 
distinctive American system of labor relations that has its origins in the Wagner Act 
model dating back to the 1930s. A key characteristic of the Wagner Act model of 
labor relations is the system of exclusive representation, where workers in a 
workplace collectively decide whether or not to be represented by a union based on 
majority rule. This sets up a sharp distinction between workplaces as being either 
17 
 
union represented or completely nonunion. In workplaces that are union represented, 
collective bargaining takes place on a decentralized basis, usually at the level of the 
firm or, most commonly, at the level of the individual establishment.  
Historically under the Wagner Act model, there was a strong emphasis on the 
use of the strike weapon in support of bargaining demands, though in recent years 
strike rates have declined dramatically (Katz et al 2007). At the same time as 
accepting the use of the strike weapon in contract renewal disputes, there was a 
concern in U.S. labor relations about the disruptive effects of industrial conflict over 
workplace issues during the term of the collective agreement. This led to the 
widespread adoption of grievance procedures culminating in binding arbitration to 
resolve workplace disputes involving the application of contract. This labor arbitration 
system receive a major boost during the 1940s when the War Labor Board 
encouraged its adoption as part of its efforts to avoid wartime strikes. During the 
postwar period, grievance-arbitration procedures became effectively universal in 
unionized workplaces as a quid pro quo for industrial peace clauses in collective 
agreements under which the union agreed not to engage in strike action during the 
term of the contract.  
The standard grievance-arbitration procedure in a unionized workplace in the 
U.S. is a multi-step procedure, typically involving 3-5 steps, in which a grievance filed 
by the union is discussed by successively higher levels of union and management 
representatives. The parties attempt to negotiate a resolution to the grievance at 
each step, with the dispute becoming more formal and serious as it escalates to 
higher levels. Ultimately if the grievance is unresolved, it is submitted to arbitration, 
where the arbitrator conducts a hearing and renders a binding decision on the 
outcome of the grievance.  
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The final labor arbitration step is central to this system of workplace dispute 
resolution. It provides both parties with finality of resolution of disputes about 
interpretation and application of the contract. Employers benefit by avoiding the 
disruptive effects of industrial action in the workplace. Employees and their unions 
benefit from the provision of industrial justice, including the important role of labor 
arbitrators in applying the just cause rule for discipline and dismissals, which is found 
in the vast majority of contracts. 
 The U.S. labor arbitration system is a privatized system of workplace dispute 
resolution. It is established by the collective agreement negotiated by the parties. The 
labor arbitrators are private, third-party neutrals, selected by the parties. A key 
feature of the success of the system is that over time there developed a strong 
professional cadre of neutral labor arbitrators, accepted by both employers and 
unions. Since the parties jointly select and pay for the arbitrators, the arbitrators have 
a strong incentive to be even-handed and responsive to the needs of the parties.  
The system of grievance-arbitration in U.S. unionized workplaces has proved 
remarkably successful and resilient. One indicator of this is that while many aspects 
of U.S. labor relations have undergone major transformations in recent decades 
(Kochan, Katz, and McKersie, 1994), grievance-arbitration procedures remain nearly 
universal in unionized workplaces and retain the same basic structure and function 
as they have since the 1950s. The most salient change in regard to these procedures 
as a result is their declining reach with the shrinking rate of union representation in 
the U.S., which by 2015 had declined to only 12.3% of the workforce (BLS, 2016).  
 
Individual Employment Rights Litigation 
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 Historically, employment law in the U.S. has been based on the doctrine of 
employment-at-will, under which an employer is entitled to dismiss an employee for 
good reason, bad reason, or no reason at all, with no need for notice, severance 
payment, or any possibility of reinstatement. This rule gave American employers free 
reign to manage their workplaces and made the U.S. a strongly employer-favorable 
system compared to other countries. The broad reach of the employment-at-will rule 
began to be curtailed in the 1930s with the Wagner Act’s prohibition of dismissing 
workers for union organizing activity and the Fair Labor Standards Act’s 
establishment of wage and hour standards. It was further restricted beginning in the 
1960s with the passage of a wave of civil rights laws banning discrimination in 
employment, including the Civil Rights Act of 1964, the Age Discrimination Act of 
1967, and later the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990. Additional limitations on 
the stark terms of the employment-at-will rule were also developed, particularly in the 
1980s, by state courts that recognized certain motivations for dismissals as violating 
public policies or contractual terms found in employee handbooks or representations 
made in hiring.  
 The result of the expansion of these statutory and common law protections in 
recent decades has been a growth in the number and importance of individual 
employment rights conflicts. During the 1990s alone, there was a 270% increase in 
the number of employment discrimination cases brought in the federal courts (Colvin 
2012). An important characteristic of how these disputes are resolved in the U.S. is 
that they are mostly handled through litigation by private parties in the general courts, 
rather than through specialized employment tribunal or government agencies. 
Although government agencies responsible for enforcing employment statutes exist 
in the U.S., they play a relatively small role. For example, the Equal Employment 
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Opportunity Commission brings less than 2% of the claims under the Civil Rights Act, 
with the remainder being brought by private parties, usually plaintiff attorneys acting 
on behalf of employees (Colvin 2016).  
 The American litigation system for resolving employment disputes is distinctive 
in the complexity of its procedures and the high risk, high reward nature of outcomes. 
The average case takes around two years to resolve through a trial (Eisenberg and 
Schlanger 2003), before which there are complex preliminary procedures including 
extensive pre-trial discovery of information from the other side and the ability to argue 
preliminary motions seeking to dismiss cases without a hearing. Employers are able 
to have many cases dismissed on preliminary summary judgment motions, making 
arguments such as that a dismissal while arguably unfair did not involve 
discrimination (Clermont and Schwab, 2004). But employees who are able to reach 
trial win many cases and have the opportunity to collect sizable damages. A study of 
federal court discrimination cases found that employees won 36.4% of cases and 
recovered median damages of $150,500 and mean damages of $336,291 (Eisenberg 
and Hill 2003), while a study of California state court wrongful dismissal cases found 
that employees won 59% of cases and recovered median damages of $296,991 
(Oppenheimer 2003).   
 The complexity of defending employment law cases as well as the uncertainty 
of outcomes with the potential for large damage awards, provides a source of 
bargaining leverage for U.S. employees in individual employment rights cases (Colvin 
2016). Most cases settle, with those that can survive summary judgment motions 
receiving particularly large settlements. The impact of the threat of employment 
litigation for U.S. employers goes beyond settlement of individual cases as many 
employers take internal organizational measures to avoid litigation, including training 
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and monitoring managers to avoid discriminatory behaviors and establishing internal 
complaint procedures to resolve problems before they result in litigation. 
 
Dispute Resolution in Nonunion Workplaces 
 The U.S. lacks any direct legal or policy requirements for organizations to 
have workplace dispute resolution procedures. By contrast, the continued adherence 
to the employment-at-will doctrine empowers employers with to manage the 
workplace unilaterally with the need for any form of employee voice or due process. 
However, in practice many U.S. companies do have internal organizational dispute 
resolution procedures, some of which are elaborate and include due process 
protections.  
 What explains the adoption of dispute resolution procedures in nonunion 
workplaces in the U.S. in the absence of legal mandates to do so? One major 
category of explanations are institutional pressures on organizations from the threats 
of union organizing and litigation (Colvin 2003). Given the all or nothing structure of 
union representation under the exclusive representation system, U.S. employers 
have a strong incentive to adopt measures that reduce the likelihood of successful 
union organizing campaigns. Nonunion dispute resolution procedures are one 
commonly used union substitution practice that many employers adopt to at least 
partially replicate the benefits of unionized workplace grievance procedures. U.S. 
employers also have strong incentives to adopt practices that reduce the threat of 
employment litigation. Nonunion dispute resolution procedures can help do this by 
resolving workplace conflicts before they develop into employment law disputes 
involving lawyers and lawsuits. These procedures may also help reduce the threat of 
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litigation by allowing employers to more readily identify and address problematic 
behavior by managers that may lead to future workplace conflicts.  
 Another category of explanations for the adoption of nonunion dispute 
resolution procedures by U.S. employers are efforts to enhance workplace conflict 
management as part of human resource strategies, particularly those with focused on 
high commitment and high involvement practices. By enhancing employee 
perceptions of due process and fairness in the workplace, these dispute resolution 
procedures can increase employee commitment to the organization and enhance 
willingness to participate in workplace decision-making. Research has found that 
adoption of dispute resolution procedures is associated with use of participatory 
practices such as self-managed work teams (Colvin 2003). 
 The lack of specific legal mandates and diverse motivations for adoption has 
led to a wide range of experimentation in forms and structures for nonunion dispute 
resolution procedures in the U.S. One area of experimentation is in who decides the 
outcome of complaints under the procedure. Whereas most companies have 
procedures with management decision-makers, some have adopted peer review 
procedures where lower level employees who are peers of the complainant sit on a 
panel that reviews and decides the outcome of the dispute (Colvin 2003). There is 
also variation in the process of dispute resolution, with some procedures including 
arbitration-like hearings and others including steps that involve some form of 
mediation to attempt to achieve a negotiated resolution of the dispute. Some 
companies have set up organizational ombudsman offices that use a range of 
consensual methods to attempt to resolve workplace conflicts. In addition, whereas 
some organizations have simple stand-alone procedures, others have adopted more 
elaborate conflict management systems with multiple elements and methods of 
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resolving a range of workplace conflicts (Lipsky et al 2003). Meanwhile, in contrast to 
these various organizational experiments in conflict resolution, many U.S. nonunion 
workplaces continue to have no dispute resolution procedures at all and workers in 
them have to rely on the goodwill of management for fair treatment in the workplace.  
 
Interactions between the Subsystems in the U.S. 
 Each of the three dispute resolution subsystems in the U.S. has its own 
distinct domain and mode of operation. In some respects they can be distinguished 
by the contrasting realms within which each of them operates. The hard distinction 
between union and nonunion workplaces in the U.S. deriving from the exclusive 
representation system produces a corresponding strong distinction between 
workplace dispute resolution systems in union and nonunion workplaces. The 
employment litigation system is built around resolution of legal claims through the 
public courts, whereas nonunion workplace dispute resolution systems have arisen in 
the absence of legal mandates and are private procedures, internal to the 
organization. 
 Despite these distinct realms, there are also important interactions between 
the three subsystems. As already described, institutional threats from both the 
unionized workplace systems and the employment litigation systems are key factors 
leading to the development of procedures in the nonunion workplace dispute 
resolution system. Although not directly linked together by public policy, these 
interactions are a type of indirect synergistic relationship that has strengthened 
nonunion workplace dispute resolution procedures. 
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 Recent years have seen an intensification of the interactions between the 
subsystems. Most notably, since the 1990s many nonunion employers have adopted 
arbitration procedures to resolve employment law disputes with employees. Under 
these procedures, known as mandatory arbitration, employees are required to enter 
into an agreement as a condition of employment stating that they will resolve any 
legal complaints against the company through binding arbitration without the option 
of going to court or appealing the arbitrator’s decision. These mandatory arbitration 
procedures have become very controversial in the U.S. as research indicates that 
arbitrators are less likely to rule in favor of employees and award much lower 
damages than the courts (Colvin 2011). In addition, mandatory arbitration procedures 
have been criticized for having due process deficiencies and arbitration decisions 
have been found to evidence a repeat player bias in favor of employers who are 
more frequent participants in arbitration (Colvin and Gough 2015). In contrast to the 
synergistic complementarities involved in the encouragement of adoption of nonunion 
workplace dispute resolution procedures, this an instance of a negative 
complementarity where the expansion of mandatory arbitration has undermined the 
effectiveness of the employment litigation system for resolving workplace disputes.  
 Another synergistic complementarity that has emerged recently is the use of 
collective labor law rights, originally focused on unions, in relation to employment law 
and nonunion workplace conflicts. Under Section 7 of the National Labor Relations 
Act, all employees have the right to engage in concerted action for mutual aid and 
protection. Although this right was traditionally applied to protect union activity in the 
workplace, it is written broadly to encompass any form of concerted action, whether 
union related or not and whatever the union status of the employees. In recent years, 
Section 7 rights have been applied more broadly to deal with conflicts like the 
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disciplining and dismissal of employees for discussing workplace problems on 
Facebook. An important current application concerns attempts to use Section 7 to bar 
employers from including in mandatory arbitration agreements bans on employees 
bringing class action claims, which if enforced would substantially limit employee 
ability to effectively litigate many legal claims.  
Another emerging area of positive complementarity involves the role of unions 
in employment law conflicts. Unions have historically enhanced the effectiveness of 
enforcement of employment law rights, such as health and safety standards and 
wage and hour rules, in unionized workplaces (Weil 1999). In the past, however 
unions showed little or no interest in representing nonunion workers apart from the 
context of union organizing campaigns where they sought to obtain representation 
status for the whole workforce under the exclusive representation system. In the last 
few years, some unions have begun focusing their efforts on using employment law 
reforms to obtain benefits for all employees, not just those in union represented 
workplaces. The most prominent and significant example of this is the efforts to 
substantially increase the minimum wage in the “Fight for $15” campaign, which 
received its signature breakthrough success in Seattle in 2013 under the leadership 
of S.E.I.U. Local 775. 
Despite these interesting recent developments, the overall structure of 
workplace dispute resolution in the U.S. remains characterized by fragmentation, 
decentralization, privatization, and individualization. There is a lack of strong 
collective structures, which is being exacerbated by the low and declining level of 
union representation in the U.S. The system of employment litigation that has 
expanded in its wake is one characterized by predominantly individual claims by 
workers. Similarly, nonunion workplace dispute resolution procedures are structures 
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designed to resolve individual worker complaints and disputes and in many cases 
established with a primary goal of avoiding collective representation of the workers. 
Workplace dispute resolution in the U.S. is also characterized by voluntary and 
privatized structures and systems. Unionized workplace grievance and arbitration 
procedures are established by contract and operated by unions and management 
with private neutral arbitrators. Although employment litigation occurs through the 
public courts, the vast majority of cases are brought by individual employees 
represented by private plaintiff attorneys. Nonunion workplace dispute resolution 
systems are private, internal organizational procedures. The rise of mandatory 
arbitration further intensifies this individualized, private structure of workplace dispute 
resolution in the U.S. as even public employment law claims are shifted to a privately 
designed and administered dispute resolution system.  
 
Italy 
The Italian system of conflict resolution is based on two different subsystems, 
the collective bargaining and the employment rights litigation system. Within the 
framework adopted in this paper, the first is voluntarist and collective in nature, while 
the second is mostly individual and regulated.  
 
Collective bargaining 
The Italian collective bargaining system is characterized by a high level of 
voluntarism and a minimal degree of legal intervention (Regalia and Regini 1998)2. 
                                                          
2 
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According to Treu, “the major feature in the Italian bargaining system is its lack of any 
specific legal provisions for the bargaining procedure, scope and content of the 
agreements and, in general, for the conduct of the parties to the negotiation and 
application of collective agreements, with the exception of provisions of civil law 
concerning contracts in general” (Treu 2007: 183). Art.39 of the Italian Constitution 
which defines the conditions under which collective agreements would have acquired 
general efficacy (erga omnes) was never enacted. Hence, in the Italian system, 
collective agreements are acts among private actors and therefore apply to the 
members of signatory employers’ associations and trade unions. A significant 
exception is related to wages, which have been considered by the jurisprudence as 
the reference point for the principle of “fair pay” as foreseen by Art.36 of the Italian 
Constitution. Still, even if highly voluntary, Italian sectoral collective agreements are 
widely applied by Italian companies. Indeed, collective bargaining coverage is 
estimated at 80% in 2010 and shows a remarkable stability over time (ICTWSS 
2016). 
The articulation of the collective bargaining system is also based on the 
agreement between the parties. Historically, the sectoral and enterprise levels have 
often vied for primacy, depending on shifting power relations among the actors 
(Regalia and Regini 1998), but generally the sectoral level set minimum standards 
which could be improved at enterprise level (Baccaro and Pulignano 2016). This 
bipolar structure was formalized by a framework agreement negotiated by the social 
partners and the government in 1993. The agreement introduced a division of labor 
between the two levels, with the national industry level setting minimum 
                                                          
  The following discussion deals only with the private sector. In the public sector, a different 
(highly formalized) system is at play, in which both the process to negotiate and the validity of collective 
agreements is regulated. 
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homogeneous standards for the industry and keeping up with inflation, and the 
company level improving conditions in the workplace and distributing productivity. In 
more recent years, pressures for reform produced divisions among the parties. One 
of the main issues has been the introduction of so called opening (or derogatory 
clauses), i.e. the possibility for lower level agreements (company or territorial) to 
derogate in pejus sectoral agreements. In 2009, a new framework agreement 
introducing opening clauses was signed by the employers' association Confindustria, 
and by two of the three confederal unions, CISL and UIL, with the strong opposition 
of CGIL. This was substituted in subsequent years with unitary agreements 
foreseeing more moderate derogatory possibilities. Still, an unprecedented 
intervention by the government aiming at decentralizing the collective bargaining 
structure took place in 2011. Indeed, decree law 138/2011 now enables enterprise 
bargaining to derogate sectoral agreements and even certain aspects of statute law 
(Pedersini and Regini 2013: 21).  
Procedures for resolving interest disputes or for defining the negotiating 
procedure are not part of the formal structure of the system. Historically, however, the 
Ministry of Labor (in its central and peripheral articulation) has frequently played a 
role of mediator among the parties in case they were unable to agree on a collective 
agreement (Treu 2007). The sole exception are contractual clauses that stipulate a 
peace obligation during the initial phase of negotiations (three months before and 
one after the expiration of a collective agreement). No other peace clauses are 
included in Italian collective agreements, though a discussion over such provisions 
reemerged in recent years (Falsone 2015).  
Conciliation procedures for dealing with the respect of standards set in the 
collective agreements are present in almost all collective agreements, but they are 
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voluntary procedures. Still, the enforcement of agreements is secured in the first 
place by the parties itself through a process of continuous bargaining and, ultimately, 
through strikes (Lassandari 2014: 310). In the workplace, employee representatives 
exercise vigilance over standards set by law or by collective agreements. Still, this 
mechanism of dispute resolution is available to only a minority of Italian employees in 
the private sector. Indeed, controlling for the numerical distribution of employees in 
companies of different sizes, the share of employees working in workplaces with 
elected employee representatives in the private sector can be estimated at around 
27% (Istat 2016), mostly concentrated in bigger companies (only around 8% of 
companies with 10 to 40 employees has an employee representatives).  
The absence of a clear definition of mutually accepted procedures for dealing 
with both interests and rights disputes within the collective bargaining system, 
encouraged recourse to conflict as a way to test and demonstrate power 
relationships (Colombo and Regalia 2016). According to the Italian Constitution, “the 
right to strike is exercised within the limits of the laws regulating it”. However, no legal 
intervention has regulated it, with the significant exception of laws regulating strikes 
in essential public services. The limits of the right to strike have been set by ordinary 
courts and by the Constitutional Court. The dominant view among Italian law scholars 
is that the right to strike is an individual right exercised collectively. This view has 
prevented its regulation through collective agreements. Indeed, the (albeit very 
limited) peace obligations entailed in collective agreements only bind signing 
organizations and not individual workers. A significant exception, again, is 
represented by the collective agreements of those sectors belonging to the so called 
“essential public sectors” in which the law required social partners to identify 
mechanisms and procedures for preventing the escalation of conflict. 
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Even if formally almost unrestricted and still quite high in comparative 
perspective, strike activity declined significantly over the last four decades. Indeed, 
while working days lost per 1,000 employees were on average more than 1,000 per 
year in the period 1970-1979 (Bordogna and Cella 2002), they were around 40 in the 
2005-2009 period (Vandaele 2016: 282). The peculiar characteristics of strike activity 
in Italy, i.e. its being comparatively less related to the unions' bargaining activity and 
more to their political activity and, hence, the fact that strikes in Italy are generally of 
short duration, is still apparent (Bordogna and Cella 2002). 
 
Employment rights litigation  
The second subsystem of the Italian conflict resolution system is constituted 
by the litigation system. This subsystem is highly regulated, with a strong role of 
labour courts and a very limited relevance of alternative instruments, such as 
alternative dispute resolution systems or arbitration, and deals with both individual 
and collective rights. In Italy, no specialized labor courts exist, but the presence of 
specialized chambers within the civil court system provides a functional equivalent to 
specialization. The system is based on three levels, the Tribunal, the Court of Appeal 
and the Supreme Court. Judges are professional and career judges and no lay 
members are used in the Italian system. Employment claims follow a special 
procedure, different from ordinary civil practice and based on the principles of 
horality, immediacy and concentration. These principles were introduced in order to 
speed up the adjudication process. Still, according to the data reported by Comandé, 
they are quite long in Italy, ranging from 536 days for the private to 604 for the public 
sector for a case being adjudicated in first instance (Comandé 2014: 121). It is 
important to note, however, that significant variation is reported across different 
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Tribunals and this variation is especially marked between the North and the South of 
the country. 
The number of new cases brought in front of Tribunals every year has been 
relatively stable (or even decreasing) over the past two decades. In 1995, the number 
of new labor cases brought in front of the courts was 195,649, while in 2013 there 
were 132,305 new cases (Istat 2016). Still, in recent years, reducing the number of 
claims has been a significant element in the political discussion. This goal has been 
pursued in multiple ways. First, there has been an attempt to subtract increasing 
areas of the employment relationship from the scrutiny of the judge, by transforming 
legal requirements for using specific types of employment contracts (such as the 
need to specify reasons for using fixed-term contracts) or introducing economic 
penalties instead of other types remedies (as in the case of unfair dismissals). 
Second, the labor trial itself was reformed, with the introduction of shorter deadlines 
for accessing justice and the introduction of fees. This last element has, according to 
several observers, made it more difficult for workers to adhere the judge. Lastly, 
attempts to promote alternative dispute resolution mechanisms were envisaged, but, 
as we will see below, with scarce effects (Menegatti 2015: 275). 
Extra-judicial dispute resolution mechanisms are not widespread in Italy. Apart 
from the period between 1998 and 2010 in which a preventive attempt of conciliation 
was mandatory before litigation, workers are free to lodge claims in front of a tribunal, 
with the sole exception, since 2012, of cases concerning individual dismissals for 
economic reasons. Two types of voluntary forms of conciliation exist: administrative 
conciliation, which is carried out by a special board at the Provincial Labour 
Directorate (the territorial office of the Labour Ministry), and trade union conciliation 
(conciliazione sindacale). Administrative conciliation is carried out by a tripartite 
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conciliation committee - composed of an official of the Labour Directorate, a trade 
union representative and a representative of the employee association. If the 
conciliation is successful, a legally enforceable agreement is produced. Meanwhile, 
trade union conciliation takes place before a trade union official, following the 
relevant procedure provided for by collective agreements. If successful, the report 
entailing the terms of the agreement must be deposited at the Provincial Labour 
Directorate. Data on conciliation is collected by the Ministry of Labour only with 
regard to administrative conciliation. In 2013, 70,079 attempts of conciliation were 
issued. Of these, 41,206 were settled, 3,752 not settled and 20,126 not dealt with 
due, in many cases, to the absence of one of the parties (Ministero del Lavoro e delle 
Politiche Sociali 2013). 
Arbitration is even rarer in Italy. Two forms of arbitration are used in Italy: ritual 
and irritual arbitration. The main distinction between the two rests in the nature of the 
award. In the case of ritual arbitration, the award itself is a legally enforceable 
decision, while in the case of irritual arbitration the award has the force of an 
agreement (and in case of non-compliance, the aggrieved party has to file a claim in 
order to obtain enforcement). Ritual arbitration can take place only in very limited 
instances: it has to be provided for by law or by collective agreement, both parties 
need to agree to arbitration, and not all statutory rights can be dealt with through this 
method. Attempts to promote irritual arbitration were enhanced in recent legislation 
(in particular, by law 183/2010). In particular, the law introduced the possibility to 
include a clause demanding future disputes go to arbitration in the individual 
employment contract (Comandé 2014: 126). However due to pressure from trade 
unions, this possibility was strongly limited. The introduction of such a clause is 
possible only under certain conditions: if it is foreseen in a collective agreement, it is 
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certified by a specific commission, it does not refer to dismissals, and it is not signed 
within the first 30 days of the validity of the employment contract (i.e. it cannot be 
signed at the moment of hiring). Hence, the efforts made to boost the use of 
arbitration for labor law disputes did not bring many results and the use of arbitration 
remains very limited. 
 
Interactions between the subsystems 
The two subsystems which characterize the Italian conflict resolution system 
are autonomous, but closely interact in a supplementary way. On the one hand, the 
wide coverage of collective agreements, stipulated within the highly voluntarist and 
collective system of collective bargaining, makes them a still very important source of 
regulation of employment. Even if statutory employment rights constitute a minimum 
floor in the absence of collective regulation, uncovered areas are much less 
widespread in Italy than in other countries, at least for what concerns dependent 
employees. Hence, employment rights are not only individual, but still largely 
collective in nature. Moreover, collective actors play a crucial role in the expression of 
individual grievances, since individual workers are often assisted by trade unions in 
dealing with them (Treu 2007: 198) and unions play a significant role in making 
workers wary of their rights. On the other hand, the public system of labour courts 
supports the functioning of the collective bargaining system by ensuring the 
compliance with the rights it sets. The declining presence of trade unions at the 
workplace level reduces their capacity to autonomously deal with compliance issues 
by the traditional instruments of continuous bargaining and collective conflict and 
makes litigation increasingly important. Moreover, labour courts support collective 
bargaining by dealing with collective rights disputes and sanctioning anti-union 
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behavior (i.e. a behavior aimed at “preventing or limiting the exercise of freedom and 
trade union activity as well as the right to strike” according to Art.28 of the so called 
Workers' Statute, law 300/1970). The supplementary role of the employment rights 
litigation subsystem has acquired growing importance in recent years, due to the 
developments taking place within the collective voluntarist bargaining system. 
Growing inter-union conflict, the spread of so called separate agreements, and the 
disruptive autonomous action of individual agents (such as Fiat's exit from the 
employer association Confindustria in order to avoid the application of the sectoral 
collective agreement) have pointed to the limits of voluntarism in dealing with 
disputes emerging within the collective bargaining system. Since 2009, labour courts 
found themselves called to solve, with the scarce instruments provided by a highly 
unregulated system, numerous judicial disputes on key functioning principles of the 
system, such as the titolarity of the right to bargain collectively and to set 
representation bodies at the plant level (Lassandari 2014). Still, the (often undesired) 
role played by judges could only put a provisional remedy to the problems deriving by 
growing inter-party disagreements in a voluntarist system, urging several 
commentators to ask for statutory regulation of industrial relations (Romagnoli 2013, 
Scarponi 2016). 
 
Australia 
Introduction 
Workplace dispute resolution in Australia is highly regulated and has both 
individual and collective elements. For much of the 20th century, the defining feature 
of Australian IR was its system of compulsory conciliation and arbitration (C & A), a 
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form of ‘delegated regulation’ (Bray and Stewart, 2013). Industrial tribunals at the 
state and federal level were charged with resolving industrial disputes between 
unions and employers through conciliation and, where necessary arbitration. 
Settlements were contained in enforceable ‘awards’ which established the minimum 
terms and conditions of employment for the majority of industries and occupations. 
As at November 2005, prior to a process of ‘modernisation’, there were an estimated 
4053 different awards in Australia (Bray, 2011). Collective bargaining played a 
secondary role (Gahan and Pekarek, 2012) and individuals enjoyed very few 
statutory employment rights (McCallum, 2011). In short, the system was collective 
and regulated.  
Today, as a result of extensive and transformational legislative change since 
the 1990s, the state remains closely involved in IR, although the role of tribunals and 
awards is very different to the past. Workers now enjoy a range of statutory 
employment rights, as well as the minimum conditions set out in revamped ‘modern 
awards’ – now made and varied through an administrative process rather than to 
settle industrial disputes (Bray and MacNeil, 2011).  The system retains a collective 
element through the role afforded to unions both in collective bargaining and the 
enforcement of individual workers’ rights, although ongoing membership decline and 
the recent contraction in bargaining coverage (Nicholson et al, 2017) suggest the 
balance will continue to shifts towards greater individualism.  
As this brief characterization suggests, the terms of employment in Australia 
can derive from different but interconnected sources, including common law 
contracts, legislated standards, and regulatory instruments such as modern awards 
or enterprise agreements (McCallum et al, 2012). The procedures for resolving 
workplace disputes can vary depending on how a particular employment relationship 
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is regulated. Because of the extent of statutory employment regulation in Australia, 
and the typically prohibitive costs of litigating contractual claims in common law 
courts for all but high-income employees (McCallum et al, 2012), the focus here is on 
the statutory workplace dispute resolution system.  
The principal statute governing industrial relations (IR) in Australia is the Fair 
Work Act (2009) (FWA). The FWA establishes a comprehensive regulatory 
framework for IR covering most Australian workplaces, with key features including a 
range of minimum employment standards contained in both legislation and ‘modern 
awards’, detailed rules for collective bargaining, and dedicated public agencies 
tasked with administering the system. In this context, workplace disputes might arise 
over the interpretation and application of existing entitlements (‘rights disputes’) and 
over the creation of new rights through collective bargaining (‘interests disputes’) 
(Provis, 1993). In seeking to resolve rights disputes, individual employees can 
generally bring complaints against employers directly, or they can seek the support of 
a union.  Although interest disputes are (still) predominantly the domain of unions, the 
FW systems affords them few exclusive responsibilities in the management of 
workplace conflict. In both these spheres of conflict, the FWA either requires or 
enables the involvement of public agencies. Specifically, an industrial tribunal called 
the Fair Work Commission (FWC) is central to the operation of the FW system and 
performs a range of functions including dispute resolution, while a separate agency, 
the Fair Work Ombudsman (FWO), is tasked with ensuring compliance with industrial 
legislation.  
 
Individual employment rights  
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The FWA provides employees with a range of protections and entitlements 
that might be the subject of employment rights disputes. At the heart of these 
provisions is a ‘safety net’ of minimum terms and conditions which comprises a set of 
ten ‘National Employment Standards’ (NES; e.g. maximum weekly working hours, 
guaranteed leave entitlements), a national minimum wage, as well as 122 ‘modern 
awards’. These modern awards set out the minimum terms and conditions (e.g. 
minimum pay) applicable to different industries (e.g. retail, banking) or occupations 
(e.g. aircraft cabin crew, nurses), and cover almost all employees. While the NES are 
contained in legislation, the national minimum wage and modern awards are made by 
the FWC. While unions can still initiate modern award proceedings, the legislative 
scope for making new moderns awards is very limited, and the FWC enjoys 
significant discretion in making or varying awards (Bray and MacNeil, 2011).  
Importantly, all modern awards include a dispute resolution clause regarding 
matters arising under the NES and the modern award. This clause sets out a 
procedure requiring that the parties first attempt to resolve the dispute through 
discussions at the workplace, before they may refer it to the FWC for resolution 
through mediation, conciliation, or where agreed by the parties, arbitration.  
Further, the FWA provides the parties with ‘general protections’ from various 
forms of unfair treatment, discrimination, and victimization in the workplace. 
Specifically, the general protections prohibit the taking of ‘adverse action’ against 
people in relation to their ‘workplace rights’ (e.g. making a complaint or inquiry about 
one’s employment), industrial activity (freedom of association), and particular 
attributes (anti-discrimination). General protection matters involving dismissal are first 
heard by the FWC and may proceed to court if unresolved, while applicants in non-
dismissal disputes can take the matter directly to court. Since 2014, the FWA also 
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contains anti-bullying provisions allowing workers to seek the FWC’s intervention to 
prevent bullying.  
Finally, the FWA offers employees protection from unfair dismissal subject to 
certain eligibility requirements. In particular, employees have to be employed for at 
least 6 months (12 months in businesses with fewer than 15 employees) before they 
can seek a remedy for being unfairly dismissed, and high income employees are 
excluded. Unfair dismissal cases are decided by the FWC. In 2015/2016, unfair 
dismissal applications amounted for more than 40 per cent of the FWC’s workload 
(FWC, 2016).  
Australian workers enjoy additional employment protections by virtue of other 
legislation, most notably in the areas of discrimination and workplace health and 
safety, however these are beyond this scope of analysis.  
Ultimately, the enforcement of provisions in the Fair Work Act happens 
through the courts. Standing to initiate proceedings depends on the type of breach. 
For example, an employee, a union, or a government inspector can seek redress for 
breaches of the NES, while this list swells to include employers and their 
organizations for contraventions of provisions in modern awards.  
 
Collective bargaining 
For much of the 20th century, collective bargaining played a secondary role in 
Australia’s system of conciliation and arbitration. From the mid-1980s, however, new 
wage-fixing principles and legislative changes have seen enterprise-level collective 
bargaining emerge as an important mechanism for setting wages and conditions of 
employment (Gahan and Pekarek, 2012). As at May 2016, an estimated 36.4 % of 
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employees were covered by collective agreements, down from 41.1 % in May 2014, 
and seven percentage points below its peak of 43.3 % in 2010(Peetz and Yu, 
2017)As different governments have pursued their industrial relations agendas, the 
rules for enterprise bargaining have become increasingly elaborate. The enterprise 
bargaining framework of the FWA is characterized by a number of key elements.  
As already noted, the legislation places emphasis on collective bargaining at 
the enterprise-level. Although there are limited provisions for multi-employer 
bargaining, employees are not permitted to take industrial action (e.g. strike) in 
pursuit of multi-employer agreements. The majority of enterprise agreements (EA) 
are applicable only to a single employer and some or all of their employees. 
Employees are only allowed to take industrial action during bargaining, and subject to 
detailed procedural requirements (e.g. secret ballot).  
Unions lack the exclusive right to represent employees in enterprise 
bargaining. Rather, employees can appoint a person of their choice (including 
themselves) as their bargaining representative for a proposed enterprise agreement. 
However, where an employee is a union member, the union is taken to be the 
employee’s default bargaining representative unless they specify otherwise. In 
practice the majority of enterprise agreements are union agreements. However, even 
where unions are involved in negotiations, an employer can put agreement offers 
directly to an employee vote, against union recommendations. Unions have suffered 
a long-term decline in membership, with density decreasing from around 40% in 1990 
to the current 15%. Together with a recent decline in the level of agreement-making 
and coverage, this raises questions about the future of collective bargaining as a 
pillar of IR regulation in Australia (Pekarek & Gahan, 2016).  
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The legislation regulates both the procedural and substantive content of 
enterprise agreements. In particular, some provisions are mandatory for all 
agreements (e.g. clauses relating to dispute resolution, change consultation) while 
certain claims are unlawful (e.g. bargaining services fees). Importantly, the 
mandatory dispute resolution clauses in enterprise agreements can specify either the 
FWC or an alternative dispute resolution (ADR) provider to assist the parties with the 
settlement of disputes (Forsyth, 2012). With the FWC providing free dispute 
resolution, uptake of ADR has been very limited. The content of agreements is vetted 
by the tribunal, with approval subject to an agreement leaving employees ‘better off 
overall’ (‘BOOT’) than the relevant ‘modern award’ (see below).  
As this suggests, the legislation provides a significant role for the FWC to 
facilitate bargaining and resolve disputes (Pekarek et al, 2017). The tribunal can 
compel reluctant employers to bargain where the majority of employees wish to 
negotiate an enterprise agreement (majority support determinations), and resolve 
disputes between parties over the appropriate coverage of a proposed enterprise 
agreement (scope orders). Moreover, the legislation requires bargaining in good faith, 
and enables the tribunal to redress tactics that breach good faith bargaining 
obligations. Finally, the tribunal can assist the parties with resolving bargaining 
disputes if so requested. However, there is only very limited scope for the FWC to 
arbitrate, in contrast with earlier periods in Australian IR.  
Coverage by collective agreements is far higher in the public sector than in the 
private sector, and there are also differences in coverage across industries, reflective 
of union density levels. For example, coverage is relatively high in transport, postal 
and warehousing (29.4 %) and financial and insurance services (23.3 %), but lower in 
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retail trade (10.1 %) and construction (9.5 %) (Peetz & Yu, 2017). The level of 
industrial disputation has declined significantly in recent decades and remains low. 
 
Complementarities, variety, and change in workplace dispute resolution 
In Australia, there is some interaction between the systems of individual 
employment rights and collective bargaining in the management of workplace 
conflict. In particular, modern awards create a floor for enterprise bargaining, in that 
the FWC is tasked with ensuring that enterprise agreements submitted for approval 
pass the BOOT – the better off overall test. The FWC applies the BOOT to assess 
whether the terms of an enterprise agreement leave employees better off overall than 
if they remained under the terms of the relevant award. Through this provision the 
collision of competing standards is avoided, and a potential source of conflict in the 
form of downward pressure on pay and conditions is removed from negotiations 
between workers and employers. The interaction of these systemic features 
constitutes a synergistic complementarity.  
 Within the realm of collective bargaining itself, the parties can seek the 
intervention of the FWC to help ensure bargaining proceeds in good faith. Although 
the parties use these provisions strategically, their existence has also had a strong 
‘shadow effect’ in promoting more orderly bargaining behavior (Pekarek et al, 2017). 
In other words, the FWC plays an important role in facilitating bargaining and 
resolving protracted and intractable disputes. There is thus a synergistic 
complementarity across the private/public (or regulatory / voluntarist) divide in that 
the legislative provisions for the involvement of a public third party can help address 
conflict between the private parties in bargaining. Because the majority of Australian 
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employees are covered by modern awards or enterprise agreements, and these 
instruments must include dispute resolution clauses, it might appear that individual 
employees can readily seek redress should disputes arise. However, there is a 
difference between the availability of legal provisions and their use is practice. In 
recent years, there have been a number of high profile, egregious examples of 
employers underpaying workers and breaking other workplace laws (Healy, 2016). 
Similarly, audits and investigations by the FWO have highlighted significant levels of 
non-compliance with workplace laws by employers in industries such as hospitality, 
fast food, and retail. The scale of non-compliance stands in contrast to the number of 
disputes lodged with the FWC under the mandatory dispute resolution clause in 
awards and enterprise agreements (s. 739), which stood at 2,033 in 2015/2016 
(FWC, 2016). Although many disputes may be resolved within organizations before 
they reach the FWC, the extent of illegal work practices uncovered in some sectors 
suggests that potential employee grievances are either not aired or not addressed. In 
short, dispute resolution clauses in regulatory instruments may not be a sufficient 
deterrent to employers adopting illegal work practices. It may be that workers are not 
aware of their legal entitlements and avenues for redress where employers fail to 
follow the law, or that employees, particularly those in small firms, might be reluctant 
to invoke the formal procedure against their employer. This raises questions about 
the enforcement of statutory employment standards and the capacity of individual 
employees to avail themselves of their legal rights (See below).  
Patterns of dispute resolution practices may also vary across sectors due to 
differences in unionization and collective bargaining. Given the need for employees 
to vote in support of proposed collective agreements, they may be more aware of 
their terms and conditions of employment, including procedures for dispute 
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resolution. Due to the association between union density and bargaining coverage, 
employees working under a collective agreement are also more likely to have access 
to union support in resolving grievances. As noted above, there are sectoral 
differences in collective bargaining coverage, which in turn suggests scope for 
significant variety in the practices of conflict resolution across workplaces.  
In the evolution of the Australia system of IR and conflict resolution a critical 
question arises over the issue of enforcement. Union density continues its longer-
term decline, and this has reduced the capacity of unions to widely enforce labor 
standards (Hardy and Howe, 2009). Although the FWO plays a proactive role in 
monitoring and enforcing compliance with workplace law, limited resources mean 
intervention is selective. In the absence of a massive increase in public funding, or a 
reversal of union decline, it remains to be seen whether an ‘enforcement gap’ will 
emerge to highlight a discrepancy between institutional design and functioning in 
Australian IR.  
 
Discussion/Conclusions 
In the introductory section of this paper we predicted that dispute resolution 
practices and institutions of our four countries could be classified along two major 
dimensions: regulated-voluntarist and individual-collective. We have also suggested 
that within each of our four countries, practices and institutions will be closely linked 
to each other, potentially leading to institutional complementarities between those 
elements composing a national system of dispute resolution.  
As our analysis of the German, US, Italian and Australian cases reveals, 
dispute resolution practices and institutions vary not only between countries but also 
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within. While our two dimensions turned out to be a fruitful heuristic to classify 
different dispute resolution practices and institutions we have also found evidence 
that in many cases elements or sub-systems within a given country provide for 
substantial variation in terms of the regulated-voluntarist and individual-collective 
dimension. Different from what the standard literature on comparative labor relations 
leads us to expect (see Figure 1), we find different subsystems to follow different key 
principles. As shown in Figure 2, the German dispute resolution system, which was 
initially classified as highly collective and regulated, is combining diverse logics. 
While the dual system of multi-employer collective bargaining and establishment-
level interest representation through works councils fits our initial assumption by 
combining a strong influence of collective actors with a high level of regulation (albeit 
state-regulation being more important in the case of works councils than in collective 
bargaining), we also find a highly regulated but individualized subsystem as well. The 
enforcement of individual statutory employment rights gains importance as collective 
bargaining and works council coverage are on decline.  
Diverse sub-systems can also be found in our Italian case. While the collective 
and voluntarist subsystem of collective bargaining fits our original perception of the 
Italian dispute resolution system, we also found a subsystem in the area of individual 
dispute resolution which is highly regulated and individual, a classification which also 
applies for the Australian “modern award” and National Employment Standards 
system, a highly regulated system which is administered by the public Fair Work 
Commission. For Australia, however, we also find a collective bargaining system with 
the so called BOOT-test resolving disagreement between state regulation (modern 
award) and collectively agreed standards. Finally, we find three different sub-patterns 
for the case of the USA. While the system of grievance-arbitration (collective and 
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voluntarist) is declining along with collective bargaining coverage (as well as union 
density), we find a growing pattern of nonunion dispute resolution, which is highly 
voluntarist and individual. Finally, we also found a highly regulated and individualized 
system based on the litigation of individual employment rights.  
While so far, practices and institutions of national dispute resolution systems 
might appear to be diverse if not chaotic, in our empirical analysis we have also 
found important ties between them. Some of those ties might provide for institutional 
complementarities.  
At a basic level, we have found regulated and individual systems of dispute 
resolutions to serve as sub-systems of final resort. With union density, collective 
bargaining and works council coverage being on decline in all the countries under 
observation, employment rights guaranteed by law provide for a minimum floor 
available to those workers who do not benefit from collective regulation of labor 
relations. Working time laws or statutory minimum wages apply even to those 
workers, who are not covered by a collective agreement. Beyond this function of 
“supplementarity” where one institution makes up for the deficiencies of the other 
(Crouch 2005), we have also observed examples of “synergies” whereby effects of 
different sub-systems mutually enforce each other (Deeg 2005: 3). The classic 
example in Germany is the way in which the reservation of distributive issues of 
wages to the collective bargaining system facilitates the focus of establishment level 
works councils on integrative negotiation issues with the potential for joint problem 
solving. However in the US also, we find that the individual employment rights 
litigation system provides a source of employee power that encourages the growth of 
nonunion dispute resolution systems incorporating some elements of fairness 
protections.  
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We also observe that as systems have changed over time there is an element 
of institutional lock-in that appears to influence or constrain the subsystems that 
emerge and the pathways of change. In Germany, the declining coverage of the dual 
system of collective representation has occurred in conjunction with an expanding 
system of statutory employment rights, but both reflect the juridification of Germany’s 
more regulated system of conflict resolution. Similarly in Australia, modern awards 
made by tribunals continue to set industry-specific minima, but there has also been 
an expansion in statutory individual employment rights. Unions remain central to 
collective bargaining but the system also provides for non-union agreement-making.  
By contrast in the US, as the more voluntarist collective bargaining subsystem 
has declined in its reach, there has been an expansion of a similarly voluntarist 
system of individualized nonunion dispute resolution. However both Italy and the US 
present some additional complexity to this picture in exhibiting growth in subsystems 
that involve regulated, individualized resolution of rights based conflicts, despite the 
voluntarist nature of other subsystems in those countries. Indeed, a striking finding 
across all four of our national systems is the growth of individualized, regulated 
conflict resolution subsystems.       
The picture that we are left with from our analysis is more complicated than the 
coherent national systems that have come out of some comparative research, such 
as the positive complementarities based systems seen in the varieties of capitalism 
literature. By contrast, analyzing workplace conflict and its resolution comparatively 
leads us to an understanding of national systems as involving complex interactions 
among subsystems that have their own institutional logics, as well as important 
synergies, supplementarities, and even in some instances negative 
complementarities.   
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Figure One: Framework for Comparing Dispute Resolution Systems 
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Figure Two: Bounded within Country Variation by Subsystem (Empirical 
Findings) 
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